Don’t let Trump let Putin miscalculate on Europe

The new U.S. National Security Strategy makes clear that President Donald Trump wants his foreign policy legacy to be “The President of Peace.” He takes credit for eight peace agreements during the past year, including Gaza. He has put his name on the U.S. Institute for Peace. He has lobbied for a Nobel Peace Prize and accepted an inaugural FIFA Peace Prize. He has been critical of America’s “forever wars.”

But some of the policies outlined in the new strategy may leave him with an entirely different legacy. He may become known as the president who allowed Russian President Vladimir Putin to miscalculate and start another major war in Europe.

It’s not too late for Trump to correct this potentially grave error.

The new strategy reaches back more than a century to assemble pieces of previous U.S. foreign policy approaches. It lists the Western Hemisphere as America’s top priority and creates a new Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, much as Teddy Roosevelt’s interventionist Corollary did. It harkens back to William McKinley’s use of tariffs in the 1890s and the destructive Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930. It embraces the use of economic power much as William Howard Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy did.

There are elements of isolationism embedded in the strategy, as was the case with Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah after World War I. There are uncomfortable echos of the America First Committee run by Charles Lindbergh and Gerald Nye who lobbied against aid to Britain in its lonely fight against Nazi Germany. And it expands on Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia,” which is listed as Trump’s second regional priority.

President Trump’s formula for global peace has some constructive elements. The strategy stresses peace through strength, much as Ronald Reagan did. It calls for strengthening America’s defense industrial base. It relies on economic sanctions and rewards as a main instrument of Trump’s peace efforts. Trump is willing to use personal diplomacy to stimulate peace talks. The strategy notes rightly that the United States is overstretched and that our allies need to do more. The strategy encourages our allies to meet their “Hague Commitment” to increase annual defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035.

But there is a potentially fatal flaw in the strategy which needs to be corrected. It has created alarming doubts about America’s enduring commitment under NATO’s Article 5. While the strategy does say the US supports its allies “in preserving the freedom and security of Europe,” that is a climb down from the “attack on one is an attack on all” language in Article 5. It is a climb down from President Joe Biden’s formula that the U.S. will defend “every inch” of NATO territory.

Despite the strategies focus on sovereignty and respect, the document contains a broad attack on European leaders and institutions. It calls European economies “in decline” due to over-regulation. It has brought America’s culture wars officially to Europe, suggesting that some European countries are risking “civilizational erasure,” a reframing of the Great Replacement Theory of the American right wing.

The strategy calls for Europe rapidly to become the primary defender of Europe. Administration officials are suggesting a 2027 deadline, which is unrealistic. It will take years for Europe to replace America’s ability to supply battlefield enablers such as operational intelligence, strategic lift, air refueling, long range fires, and missile defenses. It will take even longer for Europe to adequately strengthen its independent nuclear deterrence. Getting the transition timing wrong could be fatal.

The strategy stresses military deterrence in Asia and justifies the effort by noting the vital commercial role of the South China Sea and Taiwan’s economic and strategic importance. It does not stress deterrence in Europe to the same degree and in fact criticizes Europeans for seeing Russia as an existential threat. It places Europe third in terms of regional priorities.

The new strategy further declares that America’s global predisposition is for non-intervention. This is perhaps comforting for some Latin American countries but not for Europeans who rely on American intervention to deter Russia.

And the strategy calls for an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, for reestablishing strategic stability with Russia, and for the need to prevent unintended escalation. These may sound like noble goals, but they disregard Russia’s role as the aggressor and Putin’s opposition to a cease fire. The strategy goes so far as to blame European governments for having “unrealistic expectations” and for delaying the peace process.

The Ukraine part of the strategy must be seen in the context of Steve Witkoff’s 28-point peace plan, which essentially calls for Ukraine’s capitulation. We can be grateful to Secretary of State Marco Rubio for restructuring the peace plan so that it is somewhat acceptable to Kyiv. Putin has rejected the revised plan, and Trump’s next move is unclear. Europe is not really in the loop.

Taken together, Trump’s policies towards Europe have an isolationist flavor with lack of clarity about U.S. commitments. It undercuts deterrence. That could cause Putin to believe Europe is vulnerable and eventually to miscalculate. History is replete with such miscalculations.

The Kaiser in 1917 miscalculated the nature of American neutrality and its ability to mobilize quickly in response to unrestricted U-Boat warfare. Hitler miscalculated British long-term intentions in 1938 when Harold Macmillan flew to Munich and traded the Sudetenland for “peace in our time.” Japan miscalculated in 1941 when it attacked Pearl Harbor in an effort to destroy America’s Pacific Fleet. Kim Il Sung and Stalin miscalculated U.S. intentions in 1950 when in a speech Dean Acheson left South Korea out of America’s defense perimeter. And Saddam Hussein miscalculated in 1990 when the State Department sent Ambassador April Glaspie to say that the U.S. did not want to interfere in intra-Arab issues.

Each of those miscalculations led to war.

Putin has already miscalculated the ease with which he could defeat Ukraine. He can miscalculate again.

The United States and Europe both need to take immediate steps to re-establish a credible deterrence. Trump should reemphasize America’s enduring defense commitment to NATO and avoid significant U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe.

He should treat Russia as the aggressor in Ukraine. Europe for its part should embrace the “burden sharing network” proposed by the strategy, accelerate movement towards meeting the 5% goal, and continue to supply Ukraine with need weapons. In the longer run, a new transatlantic compact may be needed to restructure roles, responsibilities, and missions within the alliance.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was previously NSC senior director for Defense Policy and was a principal author of three national security strategies.