Pahalgam attack outfit TRF placed on US terror list
The Resistance Front (TRF) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are closely linked, with evidence suggesting TRF operates as a proxy or
The Resistance Front (TRF) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are closely linked, with evidence suggesting TRF operates as a proxy or offshoot of LeT, and both groups have historical connections to Pakistan’s ISI.
TRF as an Offshoot of LeT: Indian authorities and international observers, including the U.S. government, have identified TRF as a front or offshoot of LeT, primarily used to obscure LeT’s direct involvement in attacks in Jammu and Kashmir.
TRF emerged around 2029-20, claiming responsibility for attacks in Jammu and Kashmir, such as the April 2025 Pahalgam attack that killed 26 civilians, which Indian officials linked to LeT-trained operatives.
TRF’s initial claim of responsibility for the Pahalgam attack and subsequent retraction (alleging a hacked website) mirrors LeT’s operational pattern of avoiding direct attribution for high-profile attacks.
Shared Ideology and Objectives: Both TRF and LeT adhere to a Salafi-jihadist ideology, with a focus on “liberating” Jammu and Kashmir from India and establishing Islamic rule.
TRF recruits include members from splinter groups previously associated with LeT, indicating operational and ideological continuity.
Indian intelligence suggests TRF operates under LeT’s umbrella, receiving training, weapons, and logistical support. LeT’s Markaz-e-Taiba camp in Muridke, where 26/11 attacker Ajmal Kasab trained, was also targeted in Indian airstrikes in 2025 for backing TRF.
In 2023, the NIA filed a chargesheet against Faisal Muneer alias Ali Bhai, exposing how TRF was embedded within LeT’s larger terror web.
Shared Infrastructure: TRF is believed to utilize LeT’s extensive infrastructure, including training camps in Pakistan and PoK. LeT’s 200-acre Markaz-e-Taiba complex near Lahore and its network of over 300 madrassas are reported to support TRF’s operations.
Indian security officials have noted that TRF operatives are often trained alongside LeT cadres, sharing facilities and resources.
Connections with Pakistan’s ISI Historical ISI Support for LeT: LeT has long been considered a proxy of the ISI, receiving financial, logistical, and military support since the 1990s to conduct operations against India, particularly in Kashmir.
Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf admitted that the ISI supported and trained LeT in the 1990s to carry out militancy in Kashmir, with figures like Hafiz Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi being viewed as “heroes” at the time.
The ISI’s support included funding, training camps, and safe houses, with LeT’s operations aligning with Pakistan’s strategic goal of countering Indian influence in Kashmir and Afghanistan.
ISI Involvement with TRF: Indian authorities allege that TRF, as an LeT offshoot, benefits from the same ISI-backed infrastructure. The 2025 Pahalgam attack, attributed to TRF, was forensically linked to LeT operatives trained in Pakistan, suggesting ISI facilitation. Indian authorities allege that TRF, as an LeT offshoot, benefits from the same ISI-backed infrastructure. The 2025 Pahalgam attack, attributed to TRF, was forensically linked to LeT operatives trained in Pakistan, suggesting ISI facilitation.
In 2023, a chargesheet filed by UP Police cited a statement from gangster Atiq Ahmed claiming direct connections between his operations, the ISI, and LeT, indicating the ISI’s broader role in coordinating terrorist activities, potentially including TRF.
India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, in 2025, provided evidence linking TRF to LeT and, by extension, to ISI support, including social media posts and eyewitness accounts from the Pahalgam attack.
ISI’s Strategic Use of Proxies: The ISI views LeT as a reliable proxy against India due to its policy of refraining from attacks within Pakistan, unlike the TTP. This alignment extends to TRF, which focuses on anti-India operations in Kashmir.
Reports indicate that the ISI, backs LeT with intel, safe havens & logistics, likely aiding TRF too. Hafiz Saeed’s free movement in Pakistan despite global sanctions hints at ISI cover.
The ISI’s role in allowing LeT and its affiliates, including TRF, to operate from Pakistan was highlighted at a 2025 seminar in Kathmandu, where Nepalese officials warned of LeT’s threat to India and its potential use of Nepal as a transit route.
Post-2001 Ambivalence: Pakistan banned LeT in 2002 under international pressure & briefly arrested Hafiz Saeed, only to release him soon after. This suggests a pattern of superficial crackdowns while maintaining covert support.
The ISI’s continued support for LeT and its fronts, like Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), is evidenced by JuD’s ability to conduct mass rallies in Pakistan, such as the 2014 Lahore rally supported by state-provided trains and security.
The ISI’s complex relationship with LeT includes using it to counter anti-state militants like TTP, with LeT reportedly gathering intelligence on groups like TTP to neutralize them, further solidifying its utility to the ISI.
Key Points of Divergence, LeT’s Non-Hostility Toward Pakistan: Unlike TTP, which targets the Pakistani state, LeT and TRF focus on external targets, primarily India, making them valuable ISI proxies.
TRF’s Role in Deniability: TRF’s emergence allows LeT and the ISI to maintain plausible deniability for attacks in Kashmir, as seen in the Pahalgam attack’s retracted claim.
Critical Notes: The evidence linking TRF, LeT, and the ISI largely comes from Indian and Western sources, which Pakistan disputes, often dismissing allegations as “baseless.”
The ISI’s support for LeT and its proxies is often described as tacit or covert, making direct evidence scarce and reliant on intelligence reports, confessions (e.g., David Headley’s in the 2008 Mumbai attacks), or circumstantial patterns like Saeed’s freedom to operate. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) | EBSCO Research Starters
The complex interplay of Pakistan’s security establishment with militant groups suggests a strategic calculus where LeT and TRF are seen as assets against India, despite international condemnation. Understanding the Cozy Relationship between Pakistan ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba
TRF is widely regarded as an LeT offshoot, leveraging LeT’s infrastructure, training, and ideology to conduct attacks in Kashmir, with both groups benefiting from historical and ongoing ISI support. This relationship underscores Pakistan’s use of proxies to pursue strategic goals against India.
Below is a list of key individuals associated with TRF and their connections to LeT, based on available information. TRF is widely regarded as a proxy or offshoot of LeT, created to obscure LeT’s involvement in attacks in J&K, often with support from Pakistan’s ISI.
Key TRF Terrorists and Their LeT Connections
1. Sheikh Sajjad Gul (Current TRF Commander): Role in TRF: Listed as a terrorist under India’s UAPA. NIA placed ₹10L bounty for his role in terror acts, incl. plot to kill journalist Shujaat Bukhari.
LeT Connection: Indian authorities assert that TRF, under Gul’s leadership, operates as a front for LeT to project attacks as local resistance and evade international scrutiny, particularly under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Gul’s activities align with LeT’s broader objectives of targeting Indian security forces, civilians, and religious minorities in Jammu and Kashmir.
2. Muhammad Abbas Sheikh (Deceased, Former TRF Founder): Role in TRF: Founded TRF in October 2019 following the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir. Sheikh was a key figure in establishing TRF as a militant group, recruiting from splinter groups and leveraging online platforms for propaganda. He was killed in an encounter with Indian security forces on August 23, 2021, in Kulgam, Jammu and Kashmir.
LeT Connection: Prior to founding TRF, Sheikh was associated with Hizbul Mujahideen, but Indian security agencies claim he worked closely with LeT operatives to form TRF. The group was strategically created to rebrand LeT’s operations under a non-religious moniker to avoid FATF sanctions on Pakistan, indicating a direct operational link. Terrorist outfit lays claim to J&K tourist attack: What is The Resistance Front | Political Pulse News – The Indian Express
3. Basit Ahmed Dar (Deceased, Former TRF Operational Commander): Role in TRF: Took over as TRF’s chief operational commander after Sheikh’s death. Dar was involved in coordinating attacks, including those targeting security forces and civilians. He was killed in an encounter in Kulgam, Jammu and Kashmir, on May 7, 2024.
LeT Connection: Dar’s operations were supported by LeT’s infrastructure, including training camps and logistics in Pakistan. Indian officials indicated he was trained in Pakistan, likely at LeT facilities, before infiltrating Jammu and Kashmir to lead TRF operations.
4. Musa (Pakistani LeT Operative): Role in TRF: Identified as a hardcore LeT operative, Musa is suspected of being a key planner in the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam attack. He is believed to have led the attack team, supported by local TRF operatives. TRF only a smokescreen, Lashkar emerges as key suspect in Valley attack | India News – The Times of India
LeT Connection: Musa is explicitly identified as an LeT operative, reinforcing the direct link between TRF and LeT. Security agencies’ sketches based on eyewitness accounts point to his involvement in multiple LeT-orchestrated attacks in Kashmir.
5. Adil Thokar (Local TRF Operative): Role in TRF: A local from Anantnag, Thokar is believed to have acted as a guide and logistical supporter for the Pahalgam attack in April 2025, assisting the main assailants, including Pakistani LeT operatives. TRF only a smokescreen, Lashkar emerges as key suspect in Valley attack | India News – The Times of India
LeT Connection: Thokar’s role as a local facilitator for TRF operations underscores LeT’s strategy of using local recruits to support its broader network, with TRF serving as a front to obscure LeT’s direct involvement.
Asif Sheikh (Local TRF Operative): Role in TRF: A local from Awantipora, Sheikh is suspected of providing logistical support, including shelter, for the Pahalgam attack team in April 2025. TRF only a smokescreen, Lashkar emerges as key suspect in Valley attack | India News – The Times of India
LeT Connection: Like Thokar, Sheikh’s involvement highlights LeT’s reliance on local TRF operatives to execute attacks while maintaining deniability. His activities were coordinated with LeT operatives like Musa, indicating integration with LeT’s operational framework.
7. Faisal Muneer alias Ali Bhai: Role in TRF: Charged by India’s NIA in May 2023 for involvement in TRF’s terrorist activities, including recruitment and coordination of attacks. ANI on X: “National Investigation Agency today filed a supplementary chargesheet against one accused Faisal Muneer alias Ali Bhai in the case involving the activities of The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of the proscribed terrorist outfit, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT).” / X
LeT Connection: The NIA explicitly identifies Muneer as part of TRF, an offshoot of LeT, involved in furthering LeT’s agenda of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir through recruitment and logistical support. ANI on X: “Muneer, a resident of Talab Khatikan in J&K, has been named in the chargesheet for conspiring with Pakistan-based operatives of LeT/TRF for transportation of firearms and explosives for carrying out terrorist acts in India. He had entered into a conspiracy with his handlers based” / X
Broader LeT Leadership with TRF Connections. While the individuals below are primarily associated with LeT, their roles are relevant due to TRF’s status as an LeT proxy
1. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed: Role in LeT: Founder and chief of LeT and its front organization, JuD. Saeed has been implicated in major attacks, including the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and operates freely in Pakistan despite brief detentions. LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA | Security Council
TRF Connection: As LeT’s leader, Saeed is believed to oversee TRF’s activities indirectly, with TRF claiming responsibility for attacks like the 2025 Pahalgam massacre to shield LeT from international scrutiny. What is TRF? Hafiz Saeed claims responsibility for Pahalgam terror attack on tourists | India News – The Times of India
2. Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi: Role in LeT: Operational commander of LeT, convicted in 2021 for orchestrating the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He was arrested post-Mumbai but released on bail in 2015. Examining Extremism: Lashkar-e-Taiba | Examining Extremism | CSIS
TRF Connection: Lakhvi’s role in LeT’s operations likely extends to TRF, as the group relies on LeT’s training camps and logistical networks, which Lakhvi has historically managed.
3. Sajid Mir: Role in LeT: Mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, currently wanted by the FBI and at large. Examining Extremism: Lashkar-e-Taiba | Examining Extremism | CSIS
TRF Connection: Mir’s expertise in planning high-profile attacks for LeT likely informs TRF’s operations, given the group’s reliance on LeT’s infrastructure and tactics, as seen in the Pahalgam attack.
LeT-TRF Connection Summary – Operational Framework: TRF was formed in 2019 post the abrogation of Article 370, using cadres from LeT and Hizbul Mujahideen to project a secular, indigenous image while pursuing LeT’s Salafi-jihadist goals.
Plausible Deniability: TRF’s non-religious nomenclature and claims of responsibility (e.g., Pahalgam attack) allow LeT to evade FATF scrutiny and international sanctions, with Indian officials asserting TRF is a “smokescreen” for LeT. Terrorist outfit lays claim to J&K tourist attack: What is The Resistance Front | Political Pulse News – The Indian Express
Shared Infrastructure: TRF operatives, including Musa, are trained in LeT camps in Pakistan, such as the Markaz-e-Taiba complex in Muridke, and rely on LeT’s logistical networks for weapons and infiltration. The Resistance Front was floated to deflect international sanctions against Pakistan: security officials – The Hindu
ISI Facilitation: Both TRF and LeT are believed to receive support from Pakistan’s ISI, which provides funding, training, and safe havens. The ISI’s backing of LeT extends to TRF, as seen in the coordinated nature of attacks like Pahalgam.
Critical Notes Evidence Base: Most information comes from Indian security agencies, the U.S. Department of State, and UN reports, with Pakistan denying these links and dismissing claims as “propaganda.” Independent verification is limited due to the covert nature of these operations.
FATF Context: TRF’s creation aligns with Pakistan’s efforts to avoid FATF blacklisting, as LeT and JuD faced increased scrutiny post-2018.
Data Gaps: Specific details on TRF operatives’ training locations or direct interactions with LeT leaders are often based on intelligence reports, not public records, making some connections circumstantial.
This list focuses on individuals explicitly linked to TRF and their LeT connections, as per available sources. For further details on specific attacks or operatives, additional intelligence or open-source reporting would be needed.
